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QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether hydroelectric facilities, which impound and
divert water from a navigable water body and then
channel and release that water through their facilities into
the same water body downstream, result in "any discharge
into the navigable waters," within the meaning of Section
401 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1341.
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In the
Supreme Court of the United States
No. 04-1527
S.D. WARREN COMPANY,
v.
Petitioner,
MAINE BOARD OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, et al.,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court
Brief for the Respondents American Rivers and
Friends of the Presumpscot River
This case is steeped in American history. The water
body at issue in the case, the Presumpscot River, is
reflected in the writings of the great American poet Henry
Wadsworth Longfellow, whose family had deep roots in
Maine, especially in Gorham, near the river’s banks.1 The
1 Robert Stafford Ward, Longfellow’s Roots in Yankee Soil, 41 The New
England Q. 180,181 (1968). Part of Longfellow’s poem "An April Day,"
which he wrote when he was 17, has long been considered evocative
of the Presumpscot River: "Inverted in the tide Stand the gray rocks, and
trembling shadows throw. And the fair trees look over, side by side, And see
themselves below." See Inverted in the Tide, Postcard (1900-1910) (held 
Brown Univ., Providence, R.I.) (displaying a reproduction of 
photograph of the Presumpscot River and a four-line passage from
"An April Day" by Longfellow).
2petitioner, S.D. Warren Co., was founded by Samuel D.
Warren a few years after he and his brother Otis
purchased their first mill in 1847. His son, Samuel D.
Warren, Jr., became a close friend, law school classmate,
and law partner of Louis Brandeis, with whom he co-
authored one of the nation’s most celebrated law review
articles. 2 The modern-day controversy underlying this
case is no less expressive of the country’s history. The case
is simply the most recent in a long line of controversies
before this Court arising out of conflicts between public
rights and private interests in navigable waters. See, e.g.,
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824); Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan,
44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845); III. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146
U.S. 387 (1892); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
The precise legal issue presented is whether Congress
authorized the States to require compliance with State
water quality standards under Section 401 of the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1341. For more than 100 years,
petitioner has operated its hydroelectric facilities on the
Presumpscot River with little regard for the adverse
impact on water quality. Dammed from stem to stern, the
river has witnessed a profound decline in water quality
and the consequent extirpation of its once prodigious sea-
run fishery.
Petitioner claims the right to continue to operate its
facilities for the next forty years in violation of State water
quality standards. Because respondents American Rivers
and Friends of the Presumpscot River agree with Maine
that the plain meaning of Section 401 of the Clean Water
Act authorizes the State to require petitioner’s compliance
with Maine water quality standards, we join Maine in
urging the Court to affirm the lower court’s judgment.
2 Samuel D. Warren, Jr. and Louis Brandeis formed the Boston law
firm of Warren & Brandeis and co-authored The Right to Privacy, 4
Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). See generally Charles White Huntington, The
Warren-Clarke Genealogy: A Record of Persons Related within the Sixth
Degree to the Children of Samuel Dennis Warren and Susan Cornelia Jackson
169 (1894); Lewis J° Paper, Brandeis 21 (1983); The Westbrook History
2000 Committee & Dianne LeConte, Westbrook on the Presumpscot i
(Arcadia 2000).
Statement
This case concerns the meaning of Section 401 of the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1341. Petitioner owns and
operates five hydroelectric facilities along the Presumpscot
River in the State of Maine pursuant to federal licenses
issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 797(e).
This Court granted review limited to the threshold
jurisdictional question whether Section 401 applies to
petitioner’s facilities.
I. The Clean Water Act and Section 401
"Congress passed the Clean Water Act for the stated
purpose of ’restoring and maintaining the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.’
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)." Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159,166-67
(2001) (SWANCC); Public Utility Dist. No. 1 v. Washington
Dep’t of Ecology (PUD No. 1), 511 U.S. 700, 714 (1994). "The
’major purpose’ of the [Act] was ’to establish a
comprehensive long-range policy for the elimination of
water pollution.’" Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 318
(1981) (emphasis in original) (quoting S. Rep. No. 92-414,
92d Cong.,lst Sess. 95 (1971)).
Prior to 1972, federal water pollution control legislation
generally addressed water pollution by promoting the
adoption and implementation by the States of enforceable
water quality standards. See EPA v. California ex rel. State
Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202-05 (1976).
Because, however, a program "based on water quality
standards * * * proved ineffective" (id. at 202) standing
alone, Congress in 1972 comprehensively amended the
federal law to blend two different approaches: a permit
program designed to reduce discharges of pollutants
based on a series of technology-based effluent reduction
limitations promulgated by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency and a significantly enhanced program
of State water quality standards adopted and administered
by the States. See id. at 204-08; Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451
U.S. at 310-11; compare, e.g., EPA v. National Crushed Stone
Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 69 (1980) (technology-based effluent
limitations) with Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91,101-102
(1992) (water quality standards).
1. Technology-Based Effluent Limitations. Sections
301 and 304(b) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311,
1314(b), govern EPA’s promulgation of a series 
nationally uniform technology-based effluent limitations
applicable to categories of point source dischargers of
pollutants into the nation’s navigable waters. These
effluent limitations "translate[] Congress’ broad goal of
eliminating ’the discharge of pollutants into the navigable
waters,’ 33 U. S. C. § 1251 (a)(1), into specific requirements
that must be met by individual point sources." Nat’l
Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. at 69. Sections 301(a) and
402, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(a), 1342, ensure implementation 
the effluent limitations. Section 301(a) provides that it 
illegal for anyone to discharge pollutants into the Nation’s
waters except pursuant to a permit" (Milwaukee v. Illinois,
451 U.S. at 310-11) and Section 402 establishes the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit
program that "impose[s] limitations on the discharge of
pollutants" at least as stringent as those mandated by the
technology-based effluent limitations. Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 174 (2000).
2. Water Quality Standards. Sections 303 and 304(a) 
the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313, 1314(a), establish
the framework for State adoption and implementation of
State water quality standards. "[T]he achievement of state
water quality standards [i]s one of the Act’s central
objectives." Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 106. "Section
303 * * * requires each State, subject to federal approval, to
institute comprehensive water quality standards
establishing water quality goals for all intrastate waters."
PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 704. Section 303(c)(2)(A) further
provides that the standards established by each State shall
"protect the public health or welfare, enhance the quality
of water, and serve the purposes of this Act" and "shall be
established taking into consideration their use and value
for public water supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife,
recreational purposes and agricultural, industrial, and
other purposes * * * " 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A). 
the [Act], a water quality standard must ’consist of the
designated uses of the navigable waters involved and the
water quality criteria for such waters based upon such
uses.’" PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 714 (emphasis in original)
(quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A)).
3. Cooperative Federalism. "To achieve these
ambitious goals, the Clean Water Act establishes distinct
roles for the Federal and State Governments" (PUD No. 1,
511 U.S. at 704), amounting to "a partnership between the
States and the Federal Government, animated by a shared
objective * * * ." Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 101. EPA
promulgates the technology-based effluent limitations
applicable to point source dischargers of pollutants and
administers the Section 402 NPDES permit program, while
providing States with the option under the Act of
administering the permit program themselves, subject to
federal oversight. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)-(d); Arkansas v.
Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 102 & n.7. And, while the States are
primarily responsible under the Act for promulgating their
own State water quality standards in the first instance,
"EPA provides States with substantial guidance in the
drafting of water quality standards," reviews initial State
standards for consistency with the Clean Water Act, and
requires "that state authorities periodically review water
quality standards and secure the EPA’s approval of any
revisions in the standards." Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S.
at 101 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)).
Congress made clear, however, that the Federal-State
"partnership" is not equal in all respects, at least in terms
of each State’s ability to protect water quality within its
borders. As recently described by this Court, "Congress
chose to ’recognize, preserve, and protect the primary
responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use
6(including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) 
land and water resources, and to consult with the
Administrator in the exercise of his authority under this
chapter.’" SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 166-67 (quoting 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(b)) (emphasis supplied). To that end, nothing 
Sections 303 or 304(a) authorizes EPA to reject a water
quality standard proffered by a State for being unduly
stringent, but instead only for being not sufficiently
stringent. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313, 1314(a). And, Section 510
of the Act expressly preserves State authority to impose a
more stringent "standard or limitation respecting
discharges of pollutants" or "any requirement respecting
control or abatement of pollution," while broadly
declaring that "nothing in the [Act] shall * * * be construed
as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or
jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters
(including boundary waters) of such States." Id. § 1370.
4. Section 401. Section 401 reflects both the Federal-
State partnership within the Clean Water Act and the
separate roles served by those provisions aimed at
reducing discharges of pollutants through the imposition
of effluent limitations and those more broadly aimed at
curbing water pollution as necessary to meet State water
quality standards. In particular, Section 401 authorizes the
States to ensure that any federally licensed or permitted
activities that "may result in any discharge into the
navigable waters" shall comply with any State water
quality requirements, as well as with any other applicable
requirements of the Act, including any technology-based
effluent limitations on pollutants.
This authority derives from Sections 401(a) and 401(d).
33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)&(d). Section 401(a) requires 
applicant for a "Federal license or permit" to provide the
federal "licensing or permitting agency a certification from
the State * * * that any such discharge will comply with
applicable provisions of sections 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316,
and 1317 of this title." Id. § 1341(a). As described by this
Court, Section 401(d) "provides that any certification shall
set forth ’any effluent limitations and other limitations * *
* necessary to assure that any applicant’ will comply with
various provisions of the Act and appropriate state law
requirements." PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 711 (emphasis in
original) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d)). The Court 
further held that "state water quality standards adopted
pursuant to § 303 are among the ’other limitations’ with
which a State may ensure compliance through the § 401
certification process." Id. at 713 (quoting 33 U.S.C. 
1341(d)).
II. The Presumpscot River and S.DWarren’s
Hydroelectric Facilities
Stretching 25 miles from the outlet of Sebago Lake to
Casco Bay just north of Portland, Maine, the Presumpscot
River was once a fast moving water containing numerous
falls throughout its length. Indeed, "Presumpscot" is a
Native American name literally meaning "many shallow
rivers," or, as described by one Native American leader
"rough places river." See Charles S. Fobes, The Story of the
Presumpscot, 5 Collections and Proceedings of the Maine
Historical Society 363 (2d series 1894); Fannie Hardy
Eckstrom, Indian Place Names of the Penobscot Valley and the
Maine Coast 159 (Maine Studies No. 55, Univ. Maine 1974).
The river historically contained a large and self-sustaining
fishery, including populations of various anadromous fish
species, including Atlantic salmon, American shad, river
herring, rainbow smelt and striped bass. Pet. App. A89.
Starting sporadically in the mid-1600s and then
accelerating during the mid-1700s, settlers moving inland
and upriver from coastal villages erected a series of mills
and mill dams throughout the rapidly-falling river. See
William Willis, The History of Portland, 69-70 (1831); Fobes,
The Story of the Presumpscot, supra, at 370-80; Westbrook on
the Presumpscot, supra, at i. As the number of mill dams
increased, the impact of these dams on the anadromous
fish was significant. As early as 1776, towns filed petitions
with the colonial legislature, complaining about the
8adverse impacts of the dams on fishing.3
Samuel D. Warren purchased his first paper mill along
the Presumpscot River in 1847, forming the petitioner S.D.
Warren company soon thereafter. By 1880, he had
expanded mill operations along the river to create the
largest paper mill in the world. See Westbrook on the
Presumpscot, supra, at i; Charles E. Clark, Maine - A
Bicentennial History 136-37 (1977). The ensuing expansion
and stabilization of dams on the Presumpscot River
fundamentally transformed the water body. What had
once been a fast-flowing, continuous, biologically
productive body of water became a river formally divided
into distinct, isolated zones behind eight dams, seven of
which petitioner owns and operates. As described by the
Maine Department of Environmental Protection, "all
anadromous fish were extirpated from the river by the
construction of dams that blocked passage and by
pollution." Pet. App. A89.
This case concerns five of petitioner’s dams: the
Saccarappa, Mallison Falls, Little Falls, Gambo, and
Dundee hydroelectric facilities. See J.A. 9 (Map of
Presumpscot River Projects). Each of petitioner’s
hydroelectric facilities, like hydroelectric facilities in
general, use the gravitational force of water as it moves
down a stream from an upper elevation to a lower
elevation to drive a mechanical turbine that spins a
3 See, e.g., Commissioners of Fisheries of the State of Maine, First
Report - 1867, 35-37, 72-74 (1869); The Petition of the Towns of Cape
Elizabeth, Windham, Gorham, and Pearsontown in the County of
Cumberland Humbly Shew (Aug. 22, 1776) ("Mill Dams have been
erected on the said River the passage of all kinds of Fish * * * has been
totally obstructed & stopt in their course up said River to the great
prejudice of many back Town."), reproduced at Maine Sup. Jud. Ct. Rec.
App. vol. I, at 255-56 ; The Petition of Joseph Wefton, and others, in Behalf
of the Inhabitants of Cape-Elizabeth, Scarborough, Gorham, and Raymond-
Town, praying that an Act may pass to prevent the Obftruction of Fish
in their Passage thro’ Pefumpfcot-River and Alewive-Brook, Votes of
the Honorable House of Representatives, Tuesday, June 4, 1771, reprinted in
Journals of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, 17, 19-20
(Mass. Historical Soc’y 1979).
generator, and thereby produces electricity. 4 Hydropower
projects are classified by the nature of their operations,
including pondage, storage, reregulating, pumped back
storage, and run-of-the-river. Petitioner’s five facilities are
operated in a run-of-the-river mode, in which total water
releases downstream are matched as closely as possible to
total inflow to the project upriver on an "instantaneous
basis." Pet. App. A19. Each facility first impounds the
water upstream. The facility then diverts most of the
water through a "power canal" and then turbines to
generate electricity. After the turbines, the water is
diverted into a "tailrace channel" from which the water is
conveyed back into the river. Id. at A74-A78.5
Immediately downstream from each facility’s
impoundment is a section of the river referred to as a
"bypass reach" because this is the portion of the river that
is literally "bypassed" when the impounded water is
diverted instead through the power canal, turbines, and
tailrace channel. Petitioner’s bypass reaches range from
300 feet to one-fifth of a mile in length and have
historically contained very little (and sometimes no) water,
depending on how much otherwise impounded water
petitioner releases into the bypass through "spillways" or
"sluice gates." Petitioner’s impoundments range from 8 to
197 acres, and its dams are as tall as 50 feet. Pet. App.
A74-A77. The joint appendix (pp. 9-17) includes narrative
descriptions and illustrations of each of the five facilities.
4 See generally Hydropower Engineering Handbook (John S. Gulliver ed.,
1991); Am. Soc’y Mech. Eng’rs, The Guide to Hydropower Mechanical
Design (1996); C.C. Warnick, Hydropower Engineering (1984).
5 As a practical matter, even such projects like petitioner’s that are
run on an "instantaneous basis" require some manipulation of water
levels. Petitioner’s projects allow for "maximum 1-foot impoundment
fluctuations." Pet. App. A36. See U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Engineer
Manual: Hydropower Engineering and Design (Dec. 31,1985) (EM 1110-2-
1701); U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation Power
Research Office, Hydropower 6 (July 2005), available at
http://www.usbr.gov/power/edu/pamphlet.pdf.
10
III. Proceedings Below
1. FERC originally licensed petitioner’s five
hydroelectric facilities pursuant to the Federal Power Act,
16 U.S.C. § 797(e), in separate actions between 1979 and
1981.6 Because each of these licenses expired on January
26, 2001, petitioner applied to FERC for new 40 year
licenses. As part of that process, FERC regulations
required that petitioner’s applications include either a
copy of a water quality certification issued by the State of
Maine pursuant to Section 401 of the Clean Water Act, a
request for such a certification, or evidence of a waiver by
the State of Maine of such a certification. See 18 C.F.R. §
4.34(b)(5)(i). Because Maine did not waive its certification
authority, petitioner filed a request for certification with
the State. In making that request, however, petitioner
claimed that Section 401 does not apply to any of its five
hydroelectric facilities on the ground that none resulted in
a "discharge into navigable waters," within the meaning
of that statutory provision.
2. Respondent Maine Department of Environmental
Protection (DEP) rejected petitioner’s contention that
Section 401 does not apply to its hydropower facilities,
concluding that the "proposed continuing operation of the
Presumpscot River Projects qualifies as an ’activity’ * * *
which may result in (a) discharge into the navigable
waters of the United States." Pet. App. A82. The DEP
ultimately granted Section 401 certification to each of
petitioner’s five facilities subject to a series of express
conditions that the DEP concluded were necessary to
ensure compliance with State water quality standards that
the State had upgraded in 1985 pursuant to the Clean
Water Act. Pet. App. A121-A140; see 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c).
The DEP based its conditions on the State water quality
6 Although petitioner was operating hydroelectric projects and
therefore subject to federal regulation long before 1979, the federal
government did not formally declare the Presumpscot River a
"navigable water" until 1966. See Cent. Me. Power Co., 36 F.P.C. 976,
977 (1966).
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standards applicable to each of the segments of the
Presumpscot River where petitioner’s five facilities were
located. For each segment, the DEP identified the
applicable water quality classifications, designated uses,
and numeric and narrative water quality criteria. Pet.
App. A83-A87. The DEP concluded that petitioner’s
proposed operation of its facilities would cause violations
of those State water quality standards, including dissolved
oxygen standards applicable to certain segments of the
river, and violations of the designated uses of fishing and
habitat for fish and other aquatic life applicable to all
segments, including the bypass reaches. Id. at A88-A89,
A106-A107, A111-A112, Al16.7
The DEP explained how impoundment of waters
behind dams affects dissolved oxygen by reducing natural
aeration, increasing time of water travel, increasing water
temperature, and creating settling basins for sediments
and nutrients. Pet. App. Al14. The DEP further described
how reductions in the amount of water because of reduced
flow in segments, especially bypass reaches, adversely
affects the quality of water in those segments. Id. at A94,
A101-110. The amount of water affects water temperature
and other physical, chemical, and biological criteria
relevant to the water body’s ability to serve as an aquatic
habitat. Id. Accordingly, the DEP conditioned its Section
401 certification on, inter alia, increased releases to meet
dissolved oxygen standards, increased releases to meet
designated uses of habitat for fish and other aquatic
7 Maine water quality standards include classifications for individual
water bodies and standards for each classification, with corresponding
designated uses, numeric criteria, and narrative biological water
quality criteria. See 38 M.R.S.A. §§ 467-470, 465-465-C. The Maine
Legislature determines each water body’s classification. There are four
classes of water that are not "great ponds," Classes AA, A, B, and C,
and Class GPA for waters classified as great ponds. Id. § 465; see Pet.
App. A84-87. The Presumpcot River has different classifications for
different segments. The waters at issue in this case are designated
Class A, B, and C, and Dundee Pond is designated Class GPA. Pet.
App. A83-A84. Notwithstanding these different classifications, all of
these waters must be suitable for designated uses of fishing and
habitat for fish and other aquatic life. 38 M.R.S.A. § 465.
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habitat, restrictions on water levels and flow to avoid
maintenance drawdowns in facility impoundments, and
the installation of upstream and downstream passage
facilities for specific species of fish. Id. at A121-A140.
3. Petitioner appealed the DEP’s decision to the Maine
Board of Environmental Protection (BEP), which affirmed
the DEP in all respects. Pet. App. A35-A73. The BEP
agreed with the DEP that each of petitioner’s hydroelectric
facilities would result in "discharges," within the meaning
of Section 401, specifically rejecting petitioner’s contention
that Section 401 required such discharges to include
pollutants. Id. at A40-A42. The BEP further found that
petitioner had "not presented any persuasive arguments
or supplemental evidence calling into question the
Department’s determinations that the conditions in the
Section 401 certification regarding bypass minimum flows,
* * * fish passage, reaeration, and recreational facilities are
necessary to ensure that the operation of the Presumpscot
River Projects will comply with State water quality
standards." Id. at A47.
4. The state trial court affirmed. Pet. App. A19-A34.
The court concluded that "the rerouting of the natural flow
of the river" constitutes a "discharge" sufficient to trigger
Section 401, "despite the possible nonexistence of
pollutants in the ’discharge.’" Id. at A22-A24. The court
likewise rejected petitioner’s claim that Section 401 was
not triggered where, as here, an existing facility was being
issued a new license and there were allegedly no new
discharges from their "continued operation." Id. at A5.
Finally, the court found that none of the Section 401
conditions was "clearly erroneous." Id. at A25-A34.
5. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. Pet.
App. A1-A18. The court rejected petitioner’s claim that
Section 401 State certification authority "has not vested
because the operation of its dams does not result in a
discharge." Id. at A6. The court reasoned that "the water
that leaves the river and runs through the dam before
returning to the river constitutes a discharge for the
purposes of section [401]." Id. at A10. According to the
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court, a Section 401 "discharge" is not limited to a
"discharge of pollutant" and in this case "a discharge
results because Warren’s dams remove the water of the
river from its natural course, exercise private control over
the water and then add the water back into the river." Id.
at A8 (emphasis in original).S
Introduction and Summary of Argument
For more than 150 years, petitioner has operated a
series of hydropower facilities that have fundamentally
transformed the physical, chemical, and biological
integrity of Maine’s historic Presumpscot River. White
water has become flat water and the river’s natural ability
to serve as a host for a large and self-sustaining fishery,
including populations of various anadromous fish, has
been destroyed by petitioner’s impoundment, diversion,
and releases of water back into the Presumpscot.
This case will control the Presumpscot’s future. For the
past three decades, pursuant to the express language and
direction of the Clean Water Act, the federal and state
governments have worked cooperatively. They have
sought to balance the Clean Water Act’s directive to
protect the water quality of our country’s navigable waters
and to restore their ability to serve as a habitat for fish and
other aquatic life with the desire by those in private
industry, such as petitioner, who seek to capture the
potential energy contained within the natural flow of those
waters. This cooperative federalism has not been without
conflict but has, as a general matter, struck a successful
balance between the competing public and private
interests.
8 After the Maine BEP affirmed the DEP’s certification and
conditions, FERC granted petitioner’s new license applications to
operate its five hydroelectric facilities. See S.D. Warren Co., 105
F.E.R.C. ¶¶ 61,009, 61,010, 61,011, 61,012, 61,013 (2003); Multi-Project
Order, 105 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,136 (2003). FERC upheld its orders on petition
for rehearing by petitioner (see S.D. Warren Co., 106 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,087
(2004)), and the D.C. Circuit denied S.D. Warren’s petition for review.
See S.D. Warren Co. v. FERC, No. 04-1105 (D.C. Cir. May 6, 2005).
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Pursuant to the federal statutory scheme, the State of
Maine seeks now to "restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the State’s waters" (38
M.S.R.A. § 464(1)) by demanding for the first time in 
history of petitioner’s operations of its facilities that
petitioner comply with water quality standards
established by Maine and revised in 1985 under Section
303 of the Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313. Petitioner does not
dispute that its operation of its five hydroelectric facilities
violates those State standards. Petitioner claims the right
to continue to operate its facilities for the next forty years
unfettered by, and in violation of, the Presumpscot River’s
water quality standards, depriving Maine of its sovereign
authority to ensure that those operations comply with
those State standards. The Court should reject petitioner’s
claim and affirm the judgment of the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court.
A. First, the plain meaning of Section 401 of the Clean
Water Act belies petitioner’s claim. Section 401
unambiguously authorizes States to ensure that federally
licensed or permitted activities that "may result in any
discharge into the navigable waters" comply with State
water quality standards. Both the Maine environmental
administrative agencies and the Maine courts correctly
rejected petitioner’s threshold jurisdictional claim that its
facilities do not result in "any discharge" within the
meaning of the Clean Water Act.
Petitioner’s operation of each of its five hydroelectric
facilities results in "discharges" because their releases of
water into the Presumpscot River clearly amount to a
flowing or issuing out, emission, or pouring forth, which
is the ordinary meaning of the noun "discharge" in the
context of water. The Act does not require an addition of
pollutants for a discharge. Nor is there any merit to
petitioner’s contention that a discharge exists only if the
waters being conveyed originated from a water body
different from the one in which they are being released.
Congress deliberately provided only that a discharge
"includes" a discharge of a pollutant and, in sharp contrast
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to virtually all of the other Act’s definitions did not state
that discharge "means" discharge of a pollutant. And,
while Section 401 provides that the discharge must be
"into" navigable waters, the word "into" does not mean
that there must be an addition of something not previously
in the same water body.
B. The plain meaning of "discharge" in Section 401 is
confirmed by the purpose, structure, and legislative
history of the Clean Water Act. The structure and purpose
demonstrate that Congress intended that the Act’s
protection of water quality would not be limited to
reduction of discharges of pollutants and that the States
would retain the primary responsibility and right to
safeguard water quality by ensuring compliance with State
water quality standards within their borders. Congress,
accordingly, provided States with broad authority to
establish and enforce water quality standards, and the
federal legislature defined "pollutant" and "pollution" in
a manner reflective of the myriad ways beyond pollutant
discharges that water quality can be adversely affected to
guard against the very kind of unduly constrained
construction petitioner now advances.
Petitioner’s reliance on Clean Water Act Sections
304(f)(2) and 511(c)(2) is entirely misplaced. 
provision remotely addresses the meaning of "any
discharge" in Section 401. The former merely instructs the
Administrator to gather certain information about
pollution sources that are sometimes, but not exclusively,
nonpoint in nature, and the latter does no more than limit
the applicability of the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq., in circumstances wholly
unrelated to this case.
The relevant legislative history, moreover, leaves no
doubt that Congress understood and expressly sought in
Section 401 to authorize States to require federally licensed
hydroelectric facilities to comply with State water quality
standards. Both when Congress in 1970 originally enacted
the language now included in Section 401 and when
Congress first passed Section 401 itself in the Clean Water
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Act two years later, accompanying legislative reports and
floor debates specifically discussed its applicability to
hydroelectric facilities. Significantly, none of the textual
limitations petitioner would now import into the meaning
of "discharge" -"pollutant," "addition," and "discharge
of a pollutant" - is found anywhere in the 1970 law from
which Section 401 originates.
C. Finally, settled federal agency construction is
likewise consistent with the plain meaning of "any
discharge." The federal government, including FERC and
EPA, has long maintained that the operation of
hydroelectric facilities results in"discharges" sufficient to
trigger Section 401. Those authoritative interpretations are
reflected in numerous administrative rulings, agency
reports, and briefs filed by the Solicitor General with this
Court. All parties, including the States, regulated
industry, and individual persons, have reasonably relied
on that settled understanding for decades. If petitioner
seeks to change the law, its only recourse for doing so
should be before Congress and not this Court.
Argument
Section 401 of the Clean Water Act authorizes States to
ensure that federally licensed or permitted activities that
"may result in any discharge into the navigable waters"
comply with State water quality standards. In this case,
petitioner does not dispute that its five hydroelectric
facilities are each federally licensed or permitted within
the meaning of Section 401. Nor is there any question that
the five hydroelectric facilities are causing a violation of
State water quality standards. The Maine Department of
Environmental Protection (DEP) ruled that such 
violation would result; the Maine Board of Environmental
Protection (BEP) affirmed the validity of that factual
finding; and the trial court upheld the finding, as did the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court.
Petitioner also does not dispute that State water quality
standards under Section 401 apply to the water quality
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impacts of the federally licensed activity as a whole.
Petitioner does not, accordingly, ask this Court to overturn
its ruling in PUD No. 1 v. Washington Dep’t of Ecology, 511
U.S. at 711-12, that the certification goes to the entire
activity’s impact on State water quality standards and is
not limited to just the discharge itself, which is simply the
trigger. Nor does petitioner dispute the PUD No. 1 Court’s
further holding that"a State may include minimum stream
flow requirements in a certification issued pursuant to §
401 of the Clean Water Act insofar as necessary" to comply
with a state water quality standard designated use that the
water quality be sufficient for fish habitat. Id. at 723.
Finally, petitioner does not dispute that each of its five
hydroelectric facilities includes the kind of conveyances of
water that, apart from the question whether discharges
must always add pollutants, amount to a "point source"
within the meaning of the Clean Water Act. Petitioner’s
claim (Br. 25) is "that section 401 is inapplicable" even if its
facilities’ conveyances of water are "from a point source."9
The only question before this Court, therefore, is
whether any of the point source releases of water from
each of petitioner’s five facilities constitute a "discharge"
9 Petitioner’s indirect concession that its dams include the kinds of
conveyances treated as point sources when emitting pollutants is
compelled by the Act’s express terms. The Act expressly defines "point
source" to include "a discernible, defined, discrete conveyance" and
further lists "channel" as an illustrative example of such a source. 33
U.S.C. § 1362(14). As accurately described in petitioner’s own brief, its
facilities first "channel[ water] into a ’power canal,’ past the turbines,
and then back into the riverbed through a ’tailrace channel’" Pet. Br. 3
(emphasis supplied). It is only because the parties have stipulated that
petitioner’s conveyances do not include pollutants that this litigation
does not raise the distinct question whether dams are point sources
that discharge pollutants and therefore are subject to Section 402 of the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch,
693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Because, however, each of petitioner’s
hydroelectric facilities so clearly include at least one conveyance akin
to a point source, such as the tailrace channel, this case also does not
provide an occasion for this Court to consider the further question
whether nonpoint sources can constitute a Section 401 "discharge." See
Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. Dombeck, 172 F.3d 1092,1095-99 (9th Cir.
1998).
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within the meaning of Section 401. Petitioner maintains
(Pet. Br. 14-20) that releases of water from a facility do not
constitute discharges so long as the water being released
downstream comes from the same water body from which
the facility initially diverted the water upstream. The
lower courts correctly rejected that claim, which is
inconsistent with Section 401’s plain meaning, the
structure, purpose, and legislative history of the Clean
Water Act, and longstanding administrative interpretation
and implementation left undisturbed by Congress.
Indeed, the legal issue has been so well settled that
otherwise opposing parties before this Court in PUD No.
1 long ago agreed that the operation of hydroelectric
facilities are subject to Section 401 because they "may
result in discharges into navigable waters." 511 U.S. at 711
("Petitioners concede that, at a minimum, the project will
result in two possible discharges - the release of dredged
and fill material during the construction of the project, and
the discharge of water at the end of the tailrace * * * .’).
Nothing in this Court’s decision in South Florida Water
Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U.S. 95 (2004),
disturbs the correctness of that view.1°
10 In the lower courts, petitioner raised a second, distinct claim, only
indirectly hinted at in its petition - that even if petitioner’s facilities
would in theory require Section 401 certification upon initial licensing,
their "continued operation" does not because "relicensing of these
existing Projects will not ’result in’ any new discharge." Pet. 21. The
Maine DEP, BEP, and lower courts each correctly rejected all of
petitioner’s jurisdictional arguments, with only the trial court singling
out this distinct argument for separate discussion (see Pet. App. A25).
In its merits brief before this Court, however, petitioner nowhere
mentions this additional argument, apparently abandoning it
altogether. And for good reason. In the context of an application for
a new license upon an existing license’s expiration, the relevant
"activity" under Section 401 is the facfllty’s future operahon, which
includes the possibility that it "may result in any discharge." Whether
that activity is the same as has been licensed or permitted in the past
is of no legal consequence under the statutory language. Similarly,
under the Federal Power Act, FERC can consider the future
consequences of an existing hydroelectric facility’s operation and deny
a new license altogether, grant the license or, as FERC did here, grant
a license subject to new conditions beyond what it had imposed in the
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The Diversion and Release of Waters into the
Presumpscot River by Petitioner’s Hydroelectric
Facilities Are "Discharges" into Navigable Waters
within the Plain Meaning of Section 401
"The task of resolving the dispute over the meaning of
[Section 401] begins where all such inquires must begin:
with the language of the statute itself." United States v. Ron
Pair Enterprises, 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989). "In this case, it 
also where the inquiry should end" (id.) because the
meaning of "discharge" in the context of the Clean Water
Act is plain. The operation of each of petitioner’s five
hydroelectric facilities "results in [a] discharge into
navigable waters," within the plain meaning of Section 401
of the Clean Water Act.
1. All five of petitioner’s facilities are impounding and
diverting waters from their natural flows, and then all five
release diverted waters into navigable waters. The fact
that the waters being released or otherwise flowing from
petitioner’s facilities originate from the same navigable
water body upstream does not take them outside the plain
meaning of discharge under Section 401. The plain
meaning of discharge does not consider the source of the
discharge, but only requires that the discharge be "into"
navigable waters, and the Presumpscot River is
indisputably such a water body.
That plain meaning is provided by the ordinary
meaning of the word "discharge" in the statutory context
of the Clean Water Act. Although the Act provides that
the term" discharge" "includes" "discharge of a pollutant,"
the Act defines only what "discharge of a pollutant"
"means" and never defines the meaning of "discharge"
standing alone, which is how it stands in Section 401.
Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1362(16) ( "’discharge’ * * * includes")
with id. § 1362(12) ("’discharge of a pollutant’ * 
past license. See 16 U.S.C. § 808(a)(1) ("[T]he Commission 
authorized to issue a new license to the original licensee upon such
terms and conditions as may be authorized or required under the then
existing laws and regulations * * * ").
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means"). It is appropriate in this circumstance to look to
authoritative dictionary definitions of "discharge" to
discern its common, ordinary meaning. See Perrin v.
United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979); Burns v. Alcala, 420
U.S. 575, 580-81 (1975).
The ordinary meaning of the noun "discharge" in the
context of water is "a flowing or issuing out," "emission"
or "pouring forth." The American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language 514 (4th ed. 2000) ("a flowing out 
pouring forth; emission"); Webster’s Third New In ternational
Dictionary 644 (3d ed. 1971) ("a flowing or issuing out";
"emission"); Webster’s Second New International Dictionary
742 (2d ed. 1957) (same); Oxford English Dict ionary, 731-
32 (2d ed. 1989) ("the act of * * * pouring forth;
emission").11 The Oxford English Dictionary refers to "the
mouth of a river" as an example of a "place where
something is discharged." The Oxford English Dictionary
732. It even provides an historical example from 1798 of
the use of the term "discharges" in relation to the
operation of dams. Id.12
2. Petitioner’s operation of each of its five hydroelectric
facilities results in "discharges," within the plain meaning
of that term. Their releases of water clearly amount to "a
flowing or issuing out," "emission" or "pouring forth."
The tailrace channels, from which water diverted
upstream and channeled through turbines is released back
into the Presumpscot River downstream, are the most
n See PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 725 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The term
’discharge’ is not defined in the CWA, but its plain and ordinary
meaning suggests ’a flowing or issuing out,’ or ’something that is
emitted.’ Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 360 (1991).").
12 The plain, ordinary meaning of"discharge" in the context of water
is further confirmed by other provisions of the Clean Water Act.
Section 311 of the Act concerns liability for oil spills in navigable
waters and Section 312 provides for federal standards of performance
for marine sanitation devices. For the purposes of each of these
sections, the Act specifically provides that "’discharge’ includes, but
is not limited to, any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting,
emptying or dumping * * * ." 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(a)(2), 1322.
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obvious examples of such discharges.13
Not surprisingly, government manuals and regulations
describing the operation of dams, including hydropower
facilities, invariably refer to their releases through
spillways, gates, flashboards, channels, and turbines all as
"discharges," consistent with the ordinary meaning of that
term. See, e.g., U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Engineer
Manual: Hydropower Engineering and Design, supra, at S-4;
18 C.F.R. § 12.31(c)&(d) (FERC regulation); 33 C.F.R. 
162.230(a) (Coast Guard regulation); 33 C.F.R. 
207.170(b), 207.310(d), 207.320(c), 208.26(k), 222.2, 
(Army Corps of Eng’rs regulations).
II. None of Petitioner’s Arguments in Support of Its
Claim that Its Hydroelectric Facilities Do Not
Result In Discharges into Navigable Waters Has
Merit
Petitioner’s entire case rests on the erroneous threshold
proposition that a discharge exists for purpose of Section
401 only if what is being emitted into navigable waters by
the federally permitted or licensed activity constitutes an
"addition." Petitioner further argues that an "addition"
cannot be present where, as here, the facility is not itself
adding pollutants and is emitting water downstream into
the same navigable water body from which it initially
diverted water upstream. Petitioner purports to buttress
this argument by pointing out that Section 401 requires
that the discharge be "into" navigable waters, which
petitioner claims can occur only if the discharges originate
outside the same navigable water body. See Pet. Br. 14-20.
Petitioner’s argument is triply flawed. First, a
"discharge" does not require an "addition" in the Clean
Water Act. Petitioner is mistakenly equating the meaning
of the distinct term"discharge of a pollutant," which does
13 The operation of the tailrace channels and the manner in which
each conveys water into the Presumpscot River is well illustrated in
the sketches of each of petitioner’s five facilities prepared as part of
FERC’s Final Environmental Impact Statement, reproduced in the Joint
Appendix at 11, 13, 14, 15, 17.
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require such an "addition" of pollutants, with the meaning
of "discharge," standing alone in Section 401, which does
not. Second, as this Court itself has expressly recognized
in the Clean Water Act context, a statutory requirement
that a discharge be "into" navigable waters does not mean
that the discharge must be conveying waters not
previously in that same water body.
Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, in
presuming that the water being released by the
hydroelectric facility downstream is the same water as that
diverted upstream, petitioner completely misapprehends
both the nature of water itself and the sweep of the Clean
Water Act s concern with water quality. While the amount
of water downstream may be the same as the amount
diverted upstream, it is decidedly not the same water for
the purposes of the statute. The facility has changed it,
which is why the facility’s operation causes a violation of
State water quality standards.
A. Section 401 Requires "Any Discharge" into
Navigable Waters and Not an "Addition" to
Navigable Waters
1. Petitioner’s claim that Maine lacks Section 401
certification authority rests on the novel proffer that when
Congress stated that the term discharge includes the
discharge of a pollutant, Congress meant that a discharge
requires the discharge of a pollutant." Pet. 20 (emphasis in
original). The response, of course, is that "includes" does
not mean "requires." Quite the opposite. The language
and structure of the Clean Water Act leave no doubt that
Congress deliberately declined to define the term
"discharge" in a limited way in order to guard against the
very kind of unduly constrained construction petitioner
now advances.
Section 502 of the Clean Water Act sets forth 23
different terms of art and their definitions. See 33 U.S.C. §
1362. In every single instance but one, Congress wrote
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those definitions in terms of what each "term* * * means."14
Congress, accordingly, provided that "[t]he term
’discharge of a pollutant’ and the term ’discharge of
pollutants’ each means * * * any addition of any pollutant
to navigable waters from any point source." Id. § 1362(12)
(emphasis added).
Congress, however, made one exception in Section
502’s list of 23 terms, declining in that single isolated
instance to define the term "discharge" exclusively with
reference to what it "means." Congress separately
provided that "[t]he term ’discharge’ when used without
qualification includes a discharge of a pollutant, and a
discharge of pollutants." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(16) (emphasis
supplied). The import of the congressional decision to use
the verb "includes" instead of "means" is well settled.
"Where the definition of a term* * * was intended to be all
inclusive, it is introduced by the phrase ’to mean" rather
than ’to include.’" United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434
U.S. 159, 169 n.15 (1977). "The natural distinctions would
be that where ’means’ is employed, the term and its
definition are to be interchangeable equivalents, and that
the verb ’includes’ imports a general class, some of whose
particular instances are those specified in the definition."
14 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1362(1) ("The term ’State water pollution control
agency’ means * * *’); 1362(2) ("The term ’interstate agency’ means * *
¯ "); 1362(3) ("The term ’State’ means * * *"); 1362(4) ("The 
’municipality’ means * * *’); 1362(5) ("The term ’person’ means * * *’);
1362(6) ("The term ’pollutant’ means * * *’); 1362(7) ("The 
’navigable waters’ means * * *’); 1362(8) ("The term ’territorial seas’
means * * *"); 1362(9) ("The term ’contiguous zone’ means * * *’);
1362(10) ("The term ’ocean’ means * * *’); 1362(11) ("The term ’effluent
limitations’ means ** *’); 1362(12) ("The term ’discharge of a pollutant’
and the term’discharge of pollutants’ each means ***"); 1362(13) (’ 
term ’toxic pollutant’ means * * *’); 1362(14) ("The term ’point source’
means * * *"); 1362(15) ("The term ’biological monitoring’ shall mean *
¯ *"); 1362(17) ("The term ’schedule of compliance means * * *’);
1362(18) ("The term ’industrial user’ means * * *’); 1362(19) ("The 
’pollution’ means * * *"); 1362(20) ("The term ’medical waste’ means *
¯ *’); 1362(21) ("The term ’coastal recreation waters’ means * * *’);
1362(22) ("The term ’floatable material’ means * * *’); 1362(23) ("The
term ’pathogen indicator’ means * * *’) (emphasis supplied in all
parentheticals).
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Helvering v. Morgan’s, Inc., 293 U.S. 121,125-26 n.1 (1934).~s
There is, accordingly, no merit to petitioner’s central
claim that by providing that "the term discharge ’includes’
the discharge of a pollutant, Congress meant that a
discharge requires the discharge of a pollutant." Pet. 20
(emphasis in original). Congress’s selective use of the verb
"includes" instead underscores that a statutory reference
to "’discharge’ when used without qualification," as is true
for Section 401, "includes a discharge of a pollutant, and a
discharge of pollutants," but is not limited to those kinds
of discharges. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(16). "Discharge" refers 
a "general class" and "discharge of a pollutant" or
"pollutants" are simply "particular instances * * * specified
in the definition." Helvering, 293 U.S. at 125-26 n.1.
2. For that same reason, likewise lacking merit is
petitioner’s related claim that a "discharge" exists only if
there is an "addition" to navigable waters of the United
States. Because only "discharge of a pollutant and * * *
pollutants" are defined to mean "any addition of any
pollutant to navigable water" (33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)), 
Act cannot be fairly read as similarly requiring that a
"discharge," standing alone, requires an "addition," let
alone an "addition of any pollutant. "~6 Neither an
"addition" nor a "pollutant" requirement is therefore
~5 See United States v. American Trucking Assn, 310 U.S. 534, 545 n.29
(1940) ("Congress gives recognition to the fact that the term is not 
its face all-inclusive" by using the modifier "includes" rather than
"means"); Groman v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82, 86 (1937) ("when 
exclusive definition is intended the word ’means’ is employed * * *
whereas here the word used is ’includes’"); Federal Land Bank v.
Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 100 (1941) ("the term ’including’ 
not one of all-embracing definition, but connotes simply an illustrative
application of the general principle"); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313
U.S. 177, 189 (1941) ("The word ’including’ does lend itself to such
destructive significance.").
~6 As demonstrated at pages 40-43, infra, the legislative history
confirms the absence of any congressional intent to include an
"addition" requirement. When Congress first enacted the statutory
language now found in Section 401, "addition" was not even a
relevant term of art under then existing federal water pollution control
legislation.
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necessary to trigger Section 401’s State certification
requirement.17
B. Petitioner’s Reliance on the Statutory
Requirement that the Discharge Be "Into"
Navigable Waters and on this Court’s Decision in
Miccosukee Is Misplaced
Petitioner further argues (Pet. Br. 17, 20-22) that Section
401’s requirement that the discharge be "into" navigable
waters and this Court’s decision in South Florida Water
Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U.S. 95 (2004)
both support petitioner’s claim that a Section 401
discharge requires an"addition" and that no such addition
exists in this case. Neither that statutory language nor this
Court’s ruling, however, supports petitioner’s conclusion.
1. Contrary to petitioner’s characterization (Pet. Br. 17),
17 In this respect, while we defend the judgment of the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court below, we do not embrace its reasoning in all
respects. We agree with the State court that a discharge need not
include pollutants to trigger Section 401 (Pet. App. A8), but for the
reasons described above, we do not agree with the court that a
discharge requires "an addition." Pet. App. A6. Nor do we agree
with the court’s characterization of waters that are subject to private
control as "hav[ing] lost their status as waters of the United States."
Pet. App. A8 (emphasis in original omitted). We did not urge either
of these arguments upon the State courts in the proceedings below;
nor did we defend that aspect of the lower court’s reasoning in our
opposition to the petition in this case. See American Rivers Br. in Opp.
8 ("interpretations of what constitutes an’addition’ * * * not applicable
to what constitutes ’any discharge’ under Section 401"). None of those
statements by the State court about "addition" is, moreover, necessary
to defend its judgment because a Section 401 discharge does not
require an "addition" according to its plain terms. If, however, this
Court were to conclude otherwise, we do agree with the State court
that the requisite "addition" would in any event be present in these
cases, but not for the precise reasons offered by that court. The
addition would not be because the waters somehow lost their status
as "waters of the United States" once subject to private control, but
because petitioner’s facilities themselves transform the "physical,
chemical, and biological integrity" of the waters by their
impoundment, diversion, and channeling, and in that fundamental
respect clearly "added" something to the waters not previously
present within them. See pages 30-32, infra.
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it does not "stretch[] credulity" to posit that discharges
from a hydroelectric facility are going "into" the river
when the water originates from the same water body
upstream. The word "into" is a compound preposition of
direction that is formed by adding the word "in" to the
basic preposition of direction "to." The exclusive focus of
the preposition of direction "into" is to signify movement
in the direction of a goal. See Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s
Modern English Usage 436 (2003); The Chicago Manual of
Style § 5.163 (15th ed. 2003). Where the object being
moved was previously located is wholly irrelevant. There
is nothing inconsistent with the notion that an object is
being moved "to" or "into" a particular location where the
object may have previously been before. A more precise
way to describe such an action, while not grammatically
necessary, is to state that the object is being moved "back
to" or "back into" the previous location.
Where, as with Section 401, the relevant language
simply says "discharge into," the preposition "into"
admits of all possible circumstances, regardless of whether
the discharge is into a new or previous location. There is
nothing about the word "into" that suggests that a
"discharge into navigable waters" must be an "addition"
of something not previously in that same water body.
When water is diverted from a navigable water body, the
flow back from the diversion is "into" navigable water.
In Miccosukee, this Court made clear that "into" did not
require an "addition" and, ironically, did so in the very
sentence upon which petitioner otherwise heavily relies
(see Pet. Br. 21): the Court’s quotation of a Second Circuit
statement that "’ [i]f one takes a ladle of soup from a pot,
lifts it above the pot, and pours it back into the pot, one has
not ’added’ soup or anything else to the pot." See 541 U.S.
at 110 (emphasis added) (quoting Catskill Mountains
Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. New York, 273 F.3d 481,
492 (2d Cir. 2001)). Neither this Court nor the Second
Circuit, therefore, considered it incredulous to describe an
object going "into" a waterway even when it had
previously been in that same waterway. Indeed, nor do
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even petitioner or any of its supporting amici before this
Court, notwithstanding their legal arguments to the
contrary. Their legal briefs are replete with descriptions of
their respective hydropower facilities emitting waters
"into" rivers downstream.18
2. Petitioner’s even broader reliance (Pet. Br. 20-22) 
this Court’s decision in Miccosukee is likewise unavailing.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, Miccosukee does not support
the "conclusion[] that a discharge into the river requires an
addition of something to the river." Id. at 20. Neither
Section 401 nor the meaning of the term "discharge,"
standing alone, was at issue in Miccosukee. As petitioner
itself acknowledges, the exclusive question presented in
Miccosukee was whether a specific pumping facility was
subject "to Section 402 of the Clean Water Act," which
requires a permit "for any facility that causes ’the
discharge of any pollutant.’" Pet. Br. 20 (emphasis
supplied). What petitioner’s argument conveniently elides
is the fundamental distinction between Section 401 and
Section 402 that is fatal to its claim: While the Section 402
permit requirement at issue in Miccosukee is triggered
under Section 301(a) only by the "discharge of any
pollutant" (33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)), State certification
authority under Section 401 is triggered by "any
discharge" without the additional requirement that the
discharge be of "any pollutant."
For this reason, petitioner’s reliance on Miccosukee
collapses back into its argument that "discharge" means
"discharge of a pollutant" because "includes" means
18 See, e.g., Pet. Br. 3 ("water is channeled * * * back into the riverbed
through the ’tailrace channel’") (emphasis supplied); Amicus Br. 
England Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioner, 10 ("the physical
removal from and the replacement of the same water into the same
body of water, cannot qualify as an ’addition’) (emphasis supplied);
Amicus Br. Salt River Project & Agric. Impr. & Power Dist. in Support
of Petitioner, 1-2 ("water stored behind SRP dams * * * flows through
an outflow tunnel in the dam into the river downstream") (emphasis
supplied); Amicus Br. City of Augusta, Ga, in Support of Petitioner, 
("a channel that routes water from the River * * * and back into the
River again") (emphasis supplied).
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"requires." As described above, the latter argument lacks
merit and nothing in Miccosukee animates it. No doubt that
is why petitioner failed even to cite to Miccosukee in its
briefs before the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.
C. Petitioner’s Characterization of a Hydroelectric
Facility as "Mere Flow of a River Through a Dam"
Ignores the Undisputed Fact that Its Facilities
Cause Violations of State Water Quality
Standards
Petitioner bookends its entire presentation from the
"Question Presented" to the "Conclusion" with the flawed
notion, repeated throughout its brief, that a hydroelectric
facility is a "mere flow of a river through a dam." Pet. Br.
i, 13, 14, 18, 20, 21, 25, 26, 34; see also id. at 13 ("merely
touch upon the navigable waters"). Petitioner, however,
completely misapprehends the nature of hydroelectric
facilities, the nature of water in the ecosystem, and the
sweep of the Clean Water Act’s concern with water quality
in presuming that the water being released by the facility
downstream is essentially the same water as that
impounded and diverted upstream. Petitioner’s facilities
have a profoundly destructive impact on the quality of the
waters of the Presumpscot River.
1. While the amount of water ultimately flowing
downstream may eventually be the same as the amount of
water originally impounded and diverted upstream, it is
decidedly not the same water for the purposes of the Clean
Water Act. The hydroelectric facility has changed it,
which is why each facility’s operation causes a violation of
State water quality standards and therefore is "pollution"
affecting the "chemical, physical, and biological * * *
integrity of the water," within the meaning of the Act. See
33 U.S.C. § 1362(19). No pollutants need be physically
added for the occurrence of the kind of degradation of
water quality that constitutes water pollution within the
Act’s broad sweep. Indeed, a hydroelectric facility
fundamentally alters the physical and ecological integrity
of a river when white water becomes flat water. That is
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precisely why Section 401, unlike Section 402, is not
limited to pollutant reduction and is instead more broadly
directed at the adverse impacts on water quality of
discharges and their related activities.
Hydropower facilities, including so-called"run-of-the-
river" facilities like petitioner’s, transform the physical,
chemical and biological nature of the water. Water does
not merely flow passively through a hydroelectric facility.
If it did, the facility would not be serving its intended
function, which is to remove the energy of the water
contained within its flow potential. Hydroelectric facilities
such as petitioner’s deliberately impound, divert, channel,
and release water in order to convert the energy within
that flow into electrical energy in a manner similar to the
way that petitioner’s mill dams more than a century ago
sought to produce mechanical energy. They necessarily
have adverse environmental impacts, which is why they
are regulated pursuant to a variety of federal and state
laws, including State water quality standards. See Amicus
Br. Water and Riverine Scientists in Support of
Respondents; Amicus Br. National Wildlife Federation et
al. in Support of Respondents.19
2. Respondent Maine DEP found that petitioner’s
proposed operations of its five facilities would each violate
Maine water quality standards because of the adverse
impacts of the entire activity and not just the discharges
alone. Pet. App. A88-A89, A106-A107, A111-A112, Al16.
19 For instance, by diverting water, hydropower projects create
bypassed river channels with too little water remaining to meet the
needs of in-stream ecosystems. The remaining low volume of water
can be more easily heated and limit the ability of a water body to
tolerate pollutants. N.L. Poff et al., The Natural Flow Regime, 47
Bioscience 769-84 (1997). By increasing depth and decreasing flow, 
impoundment separates water into several layers with varying
temperature, a process known as temperature stratification, which
inhibits transfer of oxygen between layers. The subsequent release of
some water low in dissolved oxygen and other water higher in
temperature has detrimental impacts on downstream water quality.
See B.L. Yeager, Impacts of Reservoirs on the Aquatic Environment of
Regulated Rivers (Tenn. Valley Auth., Water Res., Aquatic Biology
Dep’t 1994) (TVA/WR/AB-93/1).
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The DEP concluded that petitioner’s impoundment of
waters behind dams would lower dissolved oxygen by
reducing natural aeration, increasing time of water travel,
increasing water temperature, and creating settling basins
for sediments and nutrients. Id. at 114. The DEP also
based its findings on how reduced water flow in segments
of the Presumpscot River, especially bypass reaches,
adversely affects water quality in those segments to the
extent that the smaller volumes in those segments affects
water temperature and other physical, chemical, and
biological criteria relevant to the water body’s ability to
serve as an aquatic habitat. Id. at 101-10. Here, as in PUD
No. 1, "water quantity is closely related to water quality; a
sufficient lowering of the water quantity in a body of
water could destroy all of its designated uses, be it for
drinking water, recreation, navigation, or as here, as a
fishery." 511 U.S. at 719.
The validity of DEP’s findings, which were upheld by
the Maine BEP and the state courts, are not in dispute
before this Court. Nor is the reasonableness of the license
conditions required by the DEP pursuant to its Section 401
State certification authority. Petitioner’s repeated
references to a hydroelectric facility as a "mere flow of
water through a dam" cannot be squared therefore with
the undisputedly destructive impacts that its five facilities
have had on the Presumpscot River and would continue to
have on the river absent the license conditions being
imposed by the State pursuant to Section 401.
D. In All Events, Petitioner’s Discharge of Waters
Downstream Would Amount to an "Addition"
Even if this Court were, contrary to our primary
submission, to conclude that a Section 401 "discharge"
does require an "addition" to navigable waters, such an
addition would be present here. While we do not share
the Maine Supreme Judicial Court’s view that an
"addition" is present because the waters of the
Presumpscot River ceased being navigable waters once
subject to private control (see note 17, supra), there is force
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to the state court’s basic finding that petitioner’s facilities
have in all events added something to the River.
As just described, the water discharged downstream by
petitioner’s facilities is different than the water originally
impounded and diverted upstream because of those
diversion and impoundment activities. The facilities have
not therefore merely subtracted waters. Their discharges
have added waters to the River downstream that are
fundamentally different in their physical, chemical, and
biological character than those impounded and diverted,
and that cause water pollution.
We do not read this Court’s statement in Miccosukee
that a ladling of water in and out of a single water body
does not constitute an "addition" as compelling a different
conclusion. See 541 U.S. at 110. First, the Court was
assuming that a passive ladling, as compared to an active
hydropower facility, was not changing the nature of the
water removed and released. The Court did not purport to
address the quite different issue presented where, as here,
the water being removed and then released is
fundamentally different in character either because of the
impact on water chemistry of those intervening activities
or because the time or place of removal and release are
sufficiently distanced so as to undermine the Court’s
essential assumptions of ecological equivalency. The
Court was also not purporting to decide a legal issue at all
but only describing an issue that it considered not
disputed by the parties in that case. See id. at 109 ("The
Tribe does not dispute that if C-11 and WCA-3 are simply
two parts of the same water body, pumping water from
one into the other cannot constitute an ’addition’ of
pollutants."). 2° In no event, therefore, can the Court’s
2o It is far from clear, moreover, that the Court was correct in its
assumption that the facts and related legal issue were not in dispute
in Miccosukee itself. Respondent Miccosukee Tribe filed a petition for
rehearing on that precise ground, arguing that it had expressly
declined to make such a legal or factual concession. See Petition for
Rehearing of Miccosukee Tribe, South Florida Management Dist. v.
Miccosukee Tribe, No. 02-626 (filed April 16, 2004). Although the Court
denied the petition, that denial does not amount to a ruling on the
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statement about the meaning of "addition" be considered
precedent with regard to different factual circumstances
presented in future cases.
For instance, the Clean Water Act clearly provides that
the deposit of "dredged and fill material," which typically
originates from the same water body in which it is
deposited, constitutes a "discharge of pollutants" within
the meaning of the Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344. The Act’s
definition of "pollutant" as including "dredged spoil," 33
U.S.C. § 1362(6), similarly contemplates that the removal
from, and redeposit of, a substance into the same water
body can, under certain circumstances, constitute the
"addition" of a pollutant. As with river water that is
diverted and processed through a hydroelectric facility
before being released downstream, the act of dredging
material from the bed of a stream transforms that
substance into something new - "dredged spoil" or
"dredged material" - that can adversely affect the quality
of the stream when "added" back into it. 21
III. The Plain Meaning of "Discharge" in Section
401 Is Confirmed By the Purpose, Structure, and
Legislative History of the Clean Water Act
The conclusion that the plain meaning of a Section 401
"discharge" does not require a "discharge of a pollutant"
is further supported by the Clean Water Act’s structure,
purpose, and legislative history. The structure and
purpose demonstrate that Congress intended that the Act’s
protection of water quality would not be limited to
reduction of discharges of pollutants and that the States
would retain the primary responsibility and right to
safeguard water quality within their borders. The
legislative history confirms that Congress understood the
critical role that Section 401 would play in ensuring that
States retain authority to safeguard water quality,
merits of the petition’s substantive argument. See 541 U.S. 1057 (2004).
21 See generally Amicus Br. Former EPA Asst. Administrators Charles
Fox et al. in Support of Respondents.
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including the provision’s applicability to hydropower
facilities.
A. Congress Intended to Give States Primary
Authority. to Ensure Compliance with State Water
Ouality Standards
As described at the outset of this brief (at pp. 3-7,
supra), "Congress passed the Clean Water Act for the
stated purpose of ’restoring and maintaining the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.’"
SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 166-67 (2001) (quoting 33 U.S.C. 
1251(a)). Congress established two different 
complementary legislative pathways to accomplish that
ambitious objective: (1) a series of federally-promulgated
technology-based effluent reduction limitations aimed at
discharges of pollutants administered through the Section
402 NPDES permit program; and (2) State water quality
standards administered by the States under EPA’s
supervision to regulate water pollution more generally.
See pages 3-5, supra. Consistent with this dual pathway,
Congress intentionally did not restrict "discharge" to
require "discharge of a pollutant." Nor did Congress limit
the meaning of "pollution" to adverse effects on water
quality caused by the introduction of "pollutants." And, in
similarly crafting Section 401, Congress ensured that the
Act’s broader pollution prevention goals were not
frustrated by a narrow focus on measures to reduce
pollutants. Congress provided States with Section 401
authority to require compliance with State water quality
standards by federally licensed activities whenever they
might result in "any discharge" without the further need
to establish a "discharge of a pollutant."
1. It is therefore no mere happenstance that Section 401
State certification authority is triggered by "any
discharge," while Section 402 permitting requirements are
triggered only by a "discharge of pollutants." See 33
U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a). The former is concerned 
water quality in general and the latter is central to the part
of the Act aimed at reduction of pollutants in point source
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discharges. Under Section 401, a State is authorized to
certify whether a federally licensed activity resulting in a
discharge complies with a host of the Act’s provisions,
including Section 303 under which States develop their
State water quality standards. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)
("such discharge will comply with the applicable
provisions of section[] * * * 303 * * * of this title"); PUD No.
1,511 U.S. at 714 ("state water quality standards adopted
pursuant to § 303 are among the ’other limitations’ with
which a State may ensure compliance through the Section
401 certification process" ). By contrast, even the formal
statutory title of the Section 402 permit program - the
"National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System" -
emphasizes Section 402’s exclusive focus on pollutant
reduction. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (emphasis supplied). That
same distinction between the purposes and scope of
Section 401 and 402 is also plainly why Congress provided
that "discharge .... includes" rather than "means" discharge
of a pollutant so as to allow for the broader regulatory
sweep necessary in the context of water quality standards.
2. The same careful statutory distinction is reflected in
Congress’s decision to define "pollutant" and "pollution"
quite differently in the Clean Water Act. The Act provides
that "[t]he term ’pollutant’ means dredged spoil, solid
waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage" along with a
host of other kinds of "discarded material." 33 U.S.C. §
1362(6). The Act does not, however, then define
"pollution" strictly in terms of pollutants. Instead,
consistent with the Act’s overall objective "to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the Nation’s waters" (id. § 1251(a)), the Act broadly
provides that" [t]he term’pollution’ means the man-made
or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical,
biological, and radiological integrity of water." Id. §
1362(19). The overriding statutory objective, like the
complementary definition of "pollution," "incorporated
a broad, systemic view of the goal of maintaining and
improving water quality: as the House Report on the
legislation put it, ’the word "integrity" * * * refers to a
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condition in which the natural structure and function of
ecosystems [are] maintained.’ H. R. Rep. No. 92-911, p. 76
(1972)." United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474
U.S. 121, 132-33 (1985). The definition of "pollution"
thereby recognizes that the addition of pollutants, whether
by discharge or otherwise, is not the exclusive cause of
water pollution within the Act’s purview.
Petitioner, therefore, completely misapprehends the
nature of both water pollution and the Clean Water Act
when it argues (Pet. 19) that the reason "discharge" must
require the addition of a pollutant is because "it is clear
from the outset that pollution is the raison d’etre for the
statute." Petitioner presumes that there cannot be water
pollution of concern to the Act without an addition of
pollutants. As underscored by the Act’s separate
definitions of "pollutant" and "pollution," however, it is
well settled that one can have pollution even absent this
addition of pollutants. Indeed, for just this precise reason,
this Court has already expressly found that "there is
recognition in the Clean Water Act itself that reduced
stream flow, i.e. diminishment of water quantity, can
constitute water pollution." PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 719.
3. Congress’s decision to provide States with
certification authority whenever a federally licensed
activity may result in a discharge, without requiring a
discharge of pollutants, is also consistent with the Act’s
policy to "recognize, preserve, and protect the primary
responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution * * * " 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (emphasis
supplied). As described above (pp. 5-6, supra), the Clean
Water Act creates a "a partnership between the States and
the Federal Government, animated by a shared objective
¯ * *" to restore and maintain the quality of the nation’s
waters. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 101. Yet, with
regard to the establishment and enforcement of State water
quality standards, unlike the federally-promulgated
technology-based effluent reduction limitations on
discharges of pollutants, the States are akin to the senior
partners. Albeit with some federal guidance and
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supervision, the States develop the standards, including
both the designated uses and water quality criteria,
prepare the continuing planning process for their
implementation, and "are responsible for enforcing water
quality standards on intrastate waters." PUD No. 1, 511
U.S. at 707; see id. at 714-15; 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313, 1314(a).
Section 401 promotes these same statutory objectives. As
this Court explained, "[i]n addition to these primary
enforcement responsibilities, § 401 of the Act requires
States to provide a water quality certification before a
federal license or permit can be issued for activities that
may result in any discharge into intrastate navigable
waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1341." PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 707.
4. Finally, neither Section 304(f)(2) nor 511(c)(2)(A)
supports petitioner’s claim that its hydroelectric facilities
fall outside the scope of Section 401. See Pet. Br. 24, 26-28.
Section 304(f)(2) in no manner intimates that hydropower
facilities do not result in discharges subject to Section 401.
And, Section 511 (c)(2)(A) is far too slender a statutory 
to support the contention that Congress restricted the
meaning of "discharge" to "discharges of pollutants."
a. Section 304(f) (2) is largely beside the point, which 
likely why petitioner did not cite to it even once in any of
its many pleadings before the Maine DEP or BEP, or the
state courts. To be sure, Section 304(f)(2)(F) instructs 
Administrator of EPA to provide to federal agencies, the
States, and water pollution control agencies information,
inter alia, about "methods to control pollution resulting
from * * * changes in the movement, flow, or circulation of
any navigable waters * * *, including changes caused by
the construction of dams, levees, channels, causeways, or
flow diversion facilities." 33 U.S.C. § 1314(f)(2). But in 
event does such a statutory requirement for the provision
of information support petitioner’s quite different claim
that Congress intended to exempt hydropower facilities
from Section 401 regulation. All Congress did in Section
304(f) (2) was expressly "recognize[] that water ’pollution’
may result" from the operation of dams (PUD No. 1, 511
U.S. at 719-20) and, accordingly, instruct the Administrator
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to gather and disseminate more information about ways to
address the problem.
Congress did not suggest in Section 304(f)(2) 
anywhere else in the statute that dams, or any of the other
activities listed in that Section that cause water pollution,
were exempt from otherwise applicable Clean Water Act
requirements, whether arising under Section 402 or Section
401. Indeed, it has been settled law for decades that
although Section 304(f)(2) generally concerns nonpoint
sources, many of those same listed activities listed in that
Section, including runoff from agricultural, silvicultural,
mining, and construction, are sometimes point sources
that discharge pollutants and are therefore subject to
Section 402 for that reason. Federal courts of appeals and
EPA have long expressed that view, which this Court also
recently embraced.22
b. Section 511(c)(2) is no more favorable to petitioner.
Petitioner relies heavily (Pet. Br. 26-28) on the fact that
Section 511(c)(2) limits application of the National
Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq., when
a federal agency is licensing or permitting conduct of any
activity which "may result in the discharge of a pollutant
into the navigable waters" but does not similarly limit
NEPA’s application when the activity includes only a
"discharge." 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c)(2). Petitioner offers 
as proof that Congress equated "discharge" with
22 See Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 106 (emphasis in original)
("§1314(f)(2)(F) does not explicitly exempt nonpoint pollution 
from the NPDES program if they also fall within the ’point source’
definition"); U.S.v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 372 (10th Cir.
1979); Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41, 44 (5th Cir. 1980);
Memorandum from Ann R. Klee, General Counsel & Benjamin H.
Grumbles, Assistant Administrator for Water, Agency Interpretation on
Applicability of Section 402 of the Clean Water Act to Water Transfers (Aug.
5, 2005) ("Mere mention of an activity in section 304(f) does not 
. - . .
.
. ,, .
it is exclusively nonpomt source m nature. ), EPA General Counsel
Opinion, Authority to Exclude Point Sources from the Permit Program
(Aug. 3, 1973) ("To be sure, sections 208(b)(2)(F) and 304(e) 
that Congress thought that some agricultural runoff would not be a
point source. However, these sections cannot be read to mean that
pipes, ditches, etc., are not point sources when they occur on farms.").
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"discharge of a pollutant." Section 511(c)(2), however,
cannot possibly carry the substantive weight petitioner
seeks to assign it.
Section 511(c)’s exclusive purpose is to define the
applicability of the procedural requirements of NEPA to
federal agency actions taken under the Clean Water Act.
Section 511(c)(1) provides that certain activities shall 
be deemed to trigger NEPA’s environmental impact
statement requirement (33 U.S.C. § 1371(c)(1)), and Section
511(c)(2) provides that nothing in NEPA shall be deemed
to authorize review of certain actions taken under the
Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. § 1371(c)(2)). Neither Section
511(c)(1) nor 511(c)(2), upon which petitioner 
evinces any intent to construe the scope or meaning of the
Act, let alone upset its otherwise plain meaning.
In any event, petitioner is also wrong in suggesting that
the language of Section 511(c)(2) is somehow inconsistent
with the conclusion that the plain meaning of"discharge"
does not require an addition of a pollutant. That Congress
referred in Section 511(c)(2)(A) to "discharge 
pollutant" and not, as in Section 401, to a "discharge"
merely confirms once again that Congress knew how to
state "discharge of a pollutant" when it wanted to, as it did
here and in Section 402. And, contrary to petitioner’s
assumption, there is good reason for why Congress drew
that distinction in Section 511(c)(2).
Congress’s purpose in Section 511(c) was to limit
interference by NEPA’s procedural requirements with the
EPA’s administration of the Section 402 or 404 permit
requirements and the Agency’s related promulgation of
technology-based effluent limitations on discharges of
pollutants under Sections 301 and 304(b). At the same
time, however, Congress sought to allow for continued
NEPA review when the safeguards presented by Sections
301, 304(b), 402, and 404 were not present. That is why
Section 511(c)(2) limits NEPA review when there 
"discharge of a pollutant" but not when there is a
"discharge" that does not include an addition of pollutants
and therefore does not trigger Sections 301, 304(b), 402,
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and 404. Indeed, during the committee and floor debate
on the language, individual members of Congress
discussed the need for NEPA review in just such a
circumstance and even specifically referred to "such
matters as dams licensed by the Federal Power
Commission." 118 Cong. Rec. 10646 (1972) (statement 
Rep. Abzug) (Feb. 24, 1972); see also H.R. Rep. No. 92-911,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 414 (1972) (Letter from Rep. Henry 
Reuss et. al, to Hon. John A. Blatnik, Chairman, House
Committee on Public Works).23
23 Section 511(c)’s language regarding the applicability of NEPA 
the Water Act was the result of considerable legislative compromise,
reflected in floor debates on when NEPA should and should not apply
to actions taken under the Clean Water Act, including Section 401
certifications. See 118 Cong. Rec. 10646-47,10672-73 (1972) (statements
of Representatives Abzug, Dingell, Wright, and Wolff). The versions
of the bill initially passed and reported by both the House and the
Senate each included broad NEPA exemptions for review of "water
quality considerations" whenever there was a Section 401 certification
and/or a Section 402 permit. See 117 Cong. Rec. 38885 (1971),
reproducing S. 2770 (passed Senate, Nov. 2, 1971); 118 Cong. Rec.
10804 (1972), reproducing H.R. 11896 (passed House March 29, 1972).
The Senate version applied broadly to "any discharge" (see 117 Cong.
Rec. at 38887, reproducing S. 2770, § 511(d)) and the House version
applied even more broadly to "any activity" (see 118 Cong. Rec. at
10828). The language, however, was significantly amended in
Conference Committee to eliminate the broader reference to "any
discharge" in favor of a narrower reference to "discharge of any
pollutant," reflecting the competing concerns of those seeking to avoid
NEPA interference with pollutant discharge permitting by EPA under
Section 402 and those seeking to ensure that federal agencies other
than EPA licensing activities that caused water quality problems still
had to comply with NEPA. See 118 Cong. Rec. 33700-01 (1972)
(statement of Senator Muskie presenting Conference Report); id. at
37059 (statement of Representative Dingell); H.R Conf. Rep. No. 92-
1465, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 148 (1972). Congress also had cause for
concern that NEPA might otherwise interfere with administration of
the Sections 402 and 404 permit program. A major impetus for
congressional consideration of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, was a federal
district court ruling in Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971),
which enjoined the Army Corps of Engineers permit program under
the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407, for failing to comply with
NEPA. See William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control
in the United States - State, Local and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part II, 22
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B. Section 401’s Legislative History Confirms that
"Any Discharge" Includes the Release of Water
from Hydropower Facilities Without a Showing
of an "Addition of Any Pollutants"
The legislative history confirms Section 401’s plain
meaning, including both Congress’s general intent not to
require a showing of a "discharge of pollutants" and its
specific intent to subject hydropower facilities to State
water quality certification authority. This is not an
instance where Congress allegedly "alter[ed] the
fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms
or ancillary provisions," akin to "hid[ing] elephants in
mouseholes." Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n, 531
U.S. 457, 468 (2001). Congress enacted the language 
Section 401 specifically intending the precise result
compelled by that language’s plain meaning: to subject
federally licensed hydropower facilities to State authority
to ensure compliance with State water quality standards.
1. Section 401 originated as Section 21(b) of the Water
Quality Improvement Act of 1970 ("1970 Act"), Pub. L. No.
91-224, 84 Stat. 91. The jurisdictional language from
section 401(a) that is the focus of this case- "any activity
* * * which may result in any discharge into the navigable
waters" -is, as petitioner concedes (Pet. Br. 29), "the same
language that had appeared in section 21(b) of the prior
law." When Congress first enacted that language,
Congress understood that it would apply to federally
licensed hydropower facilities. A House Report
responded to concerns that nuclear power projects would
be subject to the certification requirement by noting "that
a federal license or permit of some kind is required for
almost all electric generating plants, and any federal agency
granting the relevant license can and should condition the
grant upon compliance with applicable water quality
Stan. Envt’l L.J. 215, 260 (2003). By legislative compromise, the sole
exception for NEPA review of Section 402 permits in the statute as
finally enacted was for "the issuance of a permit under section 402 of
this title for the discharge of any pollutant by a new source." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1371(c)(1).
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standards." H.R. Rep. No. 91-127, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. 7
(1969) (emphasis supplied).24
Significantly, none of the textual limitations that
petitioner would import into Section 401(a) - "pollutant,"
"addition," and "discharge of a pollutant"- is found
anywhere in the 1970 Act. It was not until the 1972
Amendments, when Congress first mandated technology-
based effluent limitations (sections 301 and 304) and
corresponding permits for individual dischargers (sections
402 and 404), that the definitional terms on which
petitioner relies were created. As previously described (see
page 4, supra), the core of the technology-based program
was set forth in Section 301, which prohibits "the
discharge of any pollutant by any person" except in
compliance with the Act - with "discharge of a pollutant"
defined to mean "any addition of any pollutant to navigable
waters from any point source." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A)
(emphasis supplied). The terms "addition" and
"pollutant" had no jurisdictional significance in any prior
versions of the Clean Water Act extending as far back as
1948, and the phrase "discharge of a pollutant" had not
appeared at all. It is clear, therefore, that when the water
quality certification requirement first appeared in the 1970
Act, the phrase "any discharge" could not have contained
the limitations petitioner advances.
2. Contrary to petitioner’s claim (Pet. Br. 29-33),
congressional recodification of Section 21(b) of the 1970
Act as Section 401 in the 1972 Act evinces no intent to
reduce the scope of activities requiring State certification.
Not only, as petitioner concedes (Pet. Br. 29), did Congress
retain verbatim the same jurisdictional language of section
21(b)(1) - certification was still required of "[a]ny
24 The floor debates included numerous references, including by the
floor managers of the legislation, similarly reflecting the legislators’
shared understanding that the construction and operation of federally-
licensed hydropower facilities would be subject to the State
certification requirement. See, e.g., 115 Cong. Rec. 28971 (1969)
(statement of Sen. Cooper); 116 Cong. Rec. 8984 (1970) (statement 
Sen. Muskie); id. at 9004 (statement of Sen. Cooper); id. at 9332
(statement of Rep. Fallon).
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applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any
activity * * * which may result in any discharge into the
navigable waters" (Pub. L. No. 92- 500, § 401(a)(1), 86 
877) - but the contemporaneous legislative reports made
clear both congressional intent not to change the
jurisdictional scope of the certification requirement and
the legislative assumption that federally licensed
hydropower facilities would continue to be covered.2s
Congress understood that "[t]he purpose of the
certification mechanism provided in this law is to assure
that Federal licensing or permitting agencies cannot
override State water quality requirements." S. Rep. No.
92-414, at 69. "Quite obviously, reenacting precisely the
same language would be a strange way to make a change."
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 567 (1988).
3. Undaunted by either the plain meaning of the
statutory language or the clarity of the statute’s purpose,
structure, and legislative history, petitioner tenaciously
argues (Pet. Br. 30-31) that Congress should not be taken
at its word. Petitioner asks this Court to read beyond the
face of the language that Congress enacted and to discern
behind that language a legislative purpose to narrow the
zs See S. Rep. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1971) ("section
[401(a)] is substantially section 21(b) of existing law * * * amended 
ensure consistency with the bill’s changed emphasis from water
quality standards to effluent limitations based on the elimination of
any discharge of pollutants"); H.R. Rep. No. 92-911, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 121 (1972) ("Section 401 is substantially section 21(b) of 
existing law amended to assure that it conforms with the new
requirements of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act"); S. Rep. No.
92-414, supra, at 69 ("It should be noted that the Committee continues
[from section 21(b)] the authority of the State or interstate agency to act
to deny a permit and thereby prevent a Federal license or permit from
issuing * * * to a discharge source within such State * * * by such
Federal agencies as the *** Federal Power Commission’). The section
was "amended to ensure consistency" with the new focus on
technology-based effluent limitations by making clear that the
certifying State was to certify not merely that the permitted activity
would comply with applicable water quality standards (as required
under the 1970 Act), but also with the standards and limitations of
newly-adopted sections 301, 302, 306, and 307, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311,1312,
1316, 1317. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a).
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scope of Section 401. Petitioner accordingly argues (id.)
that Congress did not provide that "discharge" means
"discharge of a pollutant" for only the very narrow
purpose of making clear that "thermal discharge" would
fall within the meaning of the term "discharge."
Petitioner’s tenacity notwithstanding, its argument is
belied by the language that Congress passed. Congress
chose language that does not remotely hint at petitioner’s
proffered narrow purpose, which could have been easily
and directly accomplished by quite different language.
Congress instead took care to define the critical term
"discharge" in a deliberately inclusive fashion so as not to
restrict it to mean only a "discharge of a pollutant." All
that the legislative history cited by petitioner
demonstrates, therefore, is that Congress chose to reject
language that might have been construed as limiting the
meaning of "discharge" to either a "discharge of a
pollutant" or "thermal discharge," in favor of a broad,
inclusive, nonrestrictive definition. 26 This case provides no
occasion for this Court to depart from the plain meaning
of the language that Congress enacted in favor of a party’s
claimed discovery of a legislative body’s true intent based
upon snippets of legislative history.
III. Longstanding and Settled Administrative
Construction of Section 401 and the Reasonable
Reliance on that Construction Further Support
the View that Hydropower Facilities Result in
"Discharges" Within the Plain Meaning of
Section 401
Maine’s decision that petitioner’s facilities require
Section 401 certification is also consistent with the
longstanding policy and practice of the federal Executive
Branch dating back to 1970, when Congress first
26 Congress elsewhere resolved its debates about the proper status
of thermal discharges by including "heat" within the definition of
pollutant (see Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 886 (33 U.S.C. § 1362(6)), 
by providing for regulation of "thermal discharges" more reflective of
their distinctive character (see 86 Stat. 876 (33 U.S.C. § 1326(a)).
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established the water quality certification program in
Section 21(b) of the Water Quality Improvement Act. The
Federal Power Commission (FPC), FERC’s predecessor,
began requiring water quality certification for original or
new licenses for hydropower projects soon thereafter.
And, EPA, which has principal responsibility for
administering the Clean Water Act, has consistently
maintained that Section 401 is triggered by the operation
of a federally licensed hydroelectric facility. The States,
along with thousands of public and private users of this
Nation’s water resources, have reasonably relied on this
understanding of the water quality certification
requirement for over 35 years, and there is no basis for this
Court’s upsetting those well-settled expectations.
A. The Federal Government Has Consistently
Interpreted Section 401 as Requiring State
Certification for the Licensing and Relicensing of
Hydroelectric Facilities
1. Soon after Congress passed the 1970 Act in April
1970, the FPC began conditioning new licenses for existing
facilities, as it did for initial licenses, on the applicant’s
compliance with the state water quality certification
requirement under Section 21(b). With two early
exceptions, the FPC made the submission of a
"certification of reasonable compliance * * * with Section
21(b)’a condition of every new license that the FPC issued
to an existing facility in a published order. 27 "[A]n
27 See Empire Dist. Elec. Co., 44 F.P.C. 614, 616 ( 1970); J.P. Stevens &
Co., 44 F.P.C. 1041, 1042 (1970); Cascade Power Co., 44 F.P.C. 1195, 1196
(1970) (similar condition); W. Penn. Power Co., 44 F.P.C. 1279, 1280
(1970) (same); Dan River Mills, Inc., 44 F.P.C. 1267, 1267-68 (1970)
(same), vacated on other grounds, 51 F.P.C. 1861 (1974); Cent. Me.
Power Co., 44 F.P.C. 1451,1451-52 (1970) (same); Cent. Me. Power Co., 44
F.P.C. 1447,1447-48 (1970) (same). Beginning in 1971, the FPC worded
its license conditions differently in its published orders, while still
making clear that compliance with the 1970 Act was required. See Pac.
Gas Elec. Co., 45 F.P.C. 30, 32 (1971) (license renewal conditioned 
applicant "submit[ting] to the Commission certification of reasonable
compliance with applicable water quality standards pursuant to
Section 21(b) * * * or * * * otherwise demonstrat[ing] satisfactory
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administrative ’practice has peculiar weight’" where, as
here, "’it involves a contemporaneous construction of a
statute’ * * * " Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S.
443, 450 (1978) (quoting Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v.
United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933)). Moreover, prior
administrative construction is even more weighty because
when Congress recodified the certification requirement as
Section 401(a) of the 1972 Water Act, Congress retained the
same language to describe the scope of activities triggering
that requirement. "[R]epetition of the same language in a
new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to
incorporate its administrative and judicial interpretations
as well." Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998) (citing
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978)).
2. No doubt for this reason, the FPCasand its successor
compliance with the terms and purposes of said Water Quality Act"),
amending 44 F.P.C. 1373 (1970); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 45 F.P.C. 28, 30
(1971) (same), amending, 44 F.P.C. 1365 (1970); Bibb Mfr. Co., 45 F.P.C.
525, 525 (1971) (same); CWC Fisheries, Inc., 45 F.P.C. 980, 981 (1971)
(same); Leonard Lundgren, 47 F.P.C. 1027, 1029 (1972) (same); see also
Wash. Water Power Co., 48 F.P.C. 339, 342 (1972) (noting that water
quality certification has been obtained). But see Wash. Water Power
Co.& Lee W. Cagle, 44 F.P.C. 626 (1970); New Eng. Fish Co., 44 F.P.C. 723
(1970).28 For example, during the three years following the 1972 Act, every
published FPC order issuing a new license to an existing hydropower
facility notes that the applicant provided the Commission with proof
of state water quality certification, or of waiver of the requirement. See
Scott Paper Co., 49 F.P.C. 256, 257 (1973); Wis. Pub Serv. Corp., 50 F.P.C.
1013,1015 (1973); Village of Gresham, Wis., 51 F.P.C. 265, 265 (1974); S.C.
Elec. & Gas Co., 52 F.P.C. 537, 539 (1974); Nekoosa Edwards Paper Co.,52
F.P.C. 1020, 1021, (1974); Wis. Mich. Power, 52 F.P.C. 1201, 1201 (1974);
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 52 F.P.C. 1898,1900 (1974); Consol. Water Power Co.,
53 F.P.C. 146,147 (1975); City of Seattle, Wash., 53 F.P.C. 207, 208 (1975);
Idaho Power Co., 53 F.P.C. 1004, 1008 (1975); Wis. Pub. Serv. Corp. 53
F.P.C. 1093, 1093 (1975); Eagle-A/Linweave Div., Brown Co., 53 F.P.C.
1070,1071 (1975); Commonwealth Edison Co., 53 F.P.C. 1190,1191 (1975);
Niagra of Wis. Paper Corp., 53 F.P.C. 1437, 1437 (1975); Reeves Bros., 53
F.P.C. 1449, 1450 (1975); Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 53 F.P.C. 1657,
1659 (1975); Sho-me Power Corp., 53 F.P.C. 1999, 2000, 2009 (1975); Wis.
Pub. Serv. Corp., 54 F.P.C. 521, 522 (1975); Wis. Pub. Serv. Corp., 54
F.P.C. 535, 537 (1975); Ala. Power Co., 54 F.P.C. 2452, 2456 (1975); Pac.
Gas & Elec. Co., 54 F.P.C. 1750, 1752 (1975); Utah Power & Light Co., 54
F.P.C. 2105, 2107 (1975); Utah Power & Light Co., 54 F.P.C. 2433, 2435
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agency, FERC, have uniformly maintained that
interpretation after passage of the 1972 Act. In numerous
adjudicatory decisions, FERC has treated water released
from hydropower dams as a "discharge" for purposes of
Section 401 without regard to whether the dam in question
is discharging "pollutants" as that term is defined for
purposes of other provisions of the Clean Water Act.29
Indeed, in a recent decision, FERC squarely rejected the
argument espoused by petitioner here - that a "discharge"
for purposes of Section 401 requires the "addition" of a
"pollutant," or at least the "addition" of something from
the outside river. FERC distinguished this Court’s
decision in Miccosukee and reconfirmed its position that
water released from a hydroelectric facility constitutes a
"discharge" for purposes of Section 401. See City of
Augusta, Ga., 109 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,210 (2004).30
(1975); Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co., 54 F.P.C. 2739, 2743-44 (1975).
See, e.g., U.S. Gen. New Eng. Inc., 99 F.E.R.C. ¶ 62,025, 64,058 (2002);
Cent. Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 85 F.E.R.C ¶ 61,410, 62,557 (1998); S.C. Elec.
& Gas Co. 73 F.E.R.C. ¶ 62,124, 64,307 (1995); City of Fort Smith, 42
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,362, 62,047 (1988).3o Petitioner has mistakenly suggested that the D.C. Circuit’s opinion
in North Carolina v. FERC, 112 F.3d 1175, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1997) and
FERC’s litigation position in that case are to the contrary. Pet. 11, 15,
21; Pet. Br. 15. In that case, FERC argued and the D.C. Circuit held
that a Section 401 certification was not triggered in the context of an
amendment of an existing FERC license exclusively concerned with the
proposed construction and operation of a pipeline that would
withdraw water from a navigable water body for use as drinking
water. It was only in that distinct context of an amendment to an
existing license that FERC stated that Section 401 jurisdiction turned
on whether the change in operation, rather than the entire facility,
amounted to a discharge, and the D.C. Circuit agreed with FERC that
the pipeline did not. See 112 F.3d at 1187. But where, as here,
petitioner is seeking a new license upon expiration of an existing
license and not an amendment, FERC made clear on remand in that
same case that Section 401 jurisdiction considers the entire facility
operation, including existing discharges to be continued in the future,
and not just changes in the facility’s operation. See Va. Elec. & Power
Co., 77 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,138, 61,519 (1997). ("In a proceeding for a 
license (relicense) of the project after the original license has expired,
* * * the activity requiring certification is the continued operation of
the project" and "[t]he place of discharge is the place at which the
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3. EPA agrees. As the federal agency with primary
responsibility for the Clean Water Act, EPA has spoken to
the question presented before this Court on numerous
occasions and in no uncertain terms. The Agency has
consistently maintained in its many publications,
including guidance documents and handbooks, that
"licenses required for hydroelectric projects issued under
the Federal Power Act" are among the federal permits and
licenses "authorizing activities which may result in a
discharge to the waters" and therefore are "subject to 401
certification."31
Notwithstanding petitioner’s selective use of ellipsis
(Pet. Br. 22), nothing in the recent EPA memorandum
regarding the legal status of water transfers under the
Clean Water Act is inconsistent with EPA’s longstanding
position regarding the scope of Section 401. See Pet. Br. 22
(quoting Memorandum from Ann R. Klee, EPA General
Counsel, & Benjamin H. Grumbles, EPA Asst.
Administrator for Water, to Regional Administrators,
Agency Interpretation in Applicability of Section 402 of the
Clean Water Act to Water Transfers (Aug. 5, 2005)). 
clearly stated in that memorandum that the Agency was
not addressing the status of dams under the Water Act.
The memorandum expressly provides that "[t]his Agency
project waters leave the project impoundment or bypass facilities and
reenter the river"). Amicus Salt River Project Agric. Improv. & Power
Dist., supporting petitioner, is therefore flatly wrong in contending
(Amicus Br. 8) that the D.C. Circuit has "held that a ’discharge’ under
Section 401 of the CWA requires an ’addition’ of a substance or
substances into navigable waters."
31 EPA Ofhce of Wetlands Protection, Wetlands and 401 Certification,
20 (Apr. 1989); see, e.g., EPA Office of Water, Water Quality Standards
Handbook § 1.4 (2d 1994) ("Section 401 is intended to ensure that
Federal permits and licenses comply with applicable water quality
requirements, including State water quality standards, and applies to
all Federal agencies that grant a license or permit," including "licenses
required for hydroelectric projects issued under the Federal Power
Act"); EPA Office of Wetlands Protection, National Guidance: Water
Quality Standards for Wetlands § 6.1 (1990) ("Section 401 gives the States
the authority to grant, deny, or condition certification of Federal
permits or licenses (e.g. * * * Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
licenses * * * ) that may result in a discharge to ’waters of the U.S.").
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interpretation addresses only water transfers" and "the
movement of water through a dam is not a water transfer
because the dam merely conveys water from one location
to another within the same water body." Id. at 18 & n.18.32
4. Representing the United States before this Court, the
Solicitor General has maintained the same position. The
government’s brief in PUD No.1 more than a decade ago
asserted that the proposed hydroelectric facility in that
case, which was, like petitioner’s here, a run-of-the-river
facility, would cause multiple distinct discharges,
including a discharge "at the point where the water not
needed to run the turbines is released at the dam itself."
U.S. Amicus Br. Supporting Affirmance, PUD No. 1, at 14-
15. "[W]hen the operator of the dam releases water
through a crest-gate, sluice-gate, release valve, or other
similar device, it has caused a discharge within the
meaning of Section 401." Id. That the operation of the
proposed facility might not "add" any "pollutants" to the
river was of no moment, the United States explained,
because "Congress employed the term ’discharge’ when
used without qualification (as in Section 401(a)) 
broadly than the term ’discharge of any pollutant,’ which
is used in a number of other provisions of the CWA." Id.
at 15 n.4 (citations omitted). While neither briefs filed 
the United States nor EPA publications warrant "Chevron-
style deference," Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576,
587 (2000), such "[c]ogent administrative interpretations 
¯ * not [the] products of formal rulemaking * * *
nevertheless warrant respect." Alaska Dep’t of Envtl
Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 488 (2004) (quoting
Wash. State Dep’t of Social & Health Servs. v. Guardianship
Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 385 (2003)) (ellipsis 
32 The language that petitioner seizes is contained in a footnote
parenthetical acknowledging nothing more than EPA’s longstanding
position that point source conveyances of water by dams do not
require a Section 402 permit unless those conveyances also include
pollutants. This case, however, does not involve the status of dams
under Section 402, where there must be a "discharge of a pollutant,"
but under Section 401, where Congress required only "any discharge"
to trigger its application.
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original).
B. The Reliance Interests Created by Section 401’s
Plain Meaning Underscore the Illegitimacy of
Petitioner’s Request for Relief Securable only
from Congress and not from the Courts
The States have long relied on the plain and well-
settled meaning of Section 401 in pursuing the complex
task of setting and achieving water quality standards for
individual water bodies. In determining the appropriate
water quality goals, and in allocating the burdens for
achieving those goals among myriad dischargers, States
seek to have hydropower projects shoulder their fair share.
Over the years, the hydropower industry, among
others, has mounted several campaigns to persuade
Congress to exempt them from compliance with Section
401.°, Indeed, Congress is currently debating proposed
amendments to Section 401 as it applies to federal
permitting and licensing of oil refineries and pipelines. See
151 Cong. Rec. H8748 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 2005). Congress
has yet to pass these proposals and we believe correctly so.
But, whatever their individual merits, what is clear is that
such legislative proposals represent the only legitimate
way to achieve a change in the plain, settled meaning of a
federal statute. Cf. Morrison-Knudsen Constr. Co. v. Office of
Workers Comp., 461 U.S. 624, 636 (1983) ("If these
reasonable expectations are to be altered, that is a task for
Congress * * * ").
More than 35 years ago, Maine’s own Senator, Edmund
Muskie, described the promise of the statutory language
at issue in this case upon its initial congressional
enactment in 1970: "No polluter will be able to hide
behind a Federal license or permit as an excuse for a
violation of [a] water quality standard." 116 Cong. Rec.
33 See Claudia Copeland, Cong. Res. Serv., Clean Water Act Section
401: Background and Issues (updated Oct. 1998) (describing attempts 
exempt hydroelectric facilities from Section 401 in the wake of this
Court’s decision in PUD No. 1), available at
http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/water/h2o-3.cfm.
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8984 (1970). The State of Maine and now the United States,
including FERC, seek to honor that promise, now long
overdue in its application to the Presumpscot River. The
Court should allow them to do so.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted.
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